A decisionmaker doubts the stationarity of his environment. In response, he uses two models, one with time-varying parameters, and another with constant parameters. Forecasts are then based on a Bayesian Model Averaging strategy, which mixes forecasts from the two models. In reality, structural parameters are constant, but the (unknown) true model features expectational feedback, which the reduced form models neglect. This feedback permits fears of parameter instability to become self-confirming. Within the context of a standard linear present value asset pricing model, we use the tools of large deviations theory to show that even though the constant parameter model would converge to the (constant parameter) Rational Expectations Equilibrium if considered in isolation, the mere presence of an unstable alternative drives it out of consideration. JEL Classification Numbers: C63, D84
Introduction
Economists are often accused of disagreeing with each other, and indeed, when it comes to forecasting there is often widespread disagreement. However, there is little disagreement about how this disagreement should be resolved. At least since Bates and Granger (1969) , economists have largely agreed that forecasters should hedge their bets by averaging. 1 This paper sounds a note of caution about this model averaging strategy. The typical analysis of model averaging takes place from the perspective of an outside econometrician, one who is attempting to understand and forecast an exogenous dynamic system. Unfortunately, this perspective is of limited relevance to macroeconomic policymakers, whose primary interest in forecasting is to influence the economy. There are of course well known procedures for forecasting in the presence of feedback and endogeneity. That's what the Rational Expectations revolution was all about, and Lucas (1976) taught us how (in principle) to do it. However, the Rational Expectations Hypothesis also makes model averaging a moot issue, since it presumes agents have common knowledge of the correct underlying model. As a result, there is no disagreement to average out.
So instead of Lucas (1976) , we follow the lead of Hansen (2014) , and consider a model in which 'inside' agents, who fear model misspecification, employ the same procedures recommended and studied by 'outside' econometricians. In particular, we study the interactions among three groups of agents -A policymaker who must forecast a future price, and two Date: January, 2016. We thank Mikhail Anufriev, Jim Bullard, Albert Marcet, Tom Sargent, and Noah Williams for helpful comments and discussions. Shirley Xia provided expert research assistance. 1 Timmermann (2006) emphasizes that the case for averaging rests on both solid decision-theoretic foundations, and on a wealth of practical experience. He also notes that the benefits from averaging are robust to the precise way in which forecasts are combined.
competing forecasters who construct and revise models of the price process. Disagreement centers on the stationarity of the underlying environment. One forecaster thinks the environment is stationary, and so (recursively) estimates a constant parameter model. The other forecaster thinks the environment is nonstationary, and so estimates a model with drifting parameters. The policymaker isn't sure who is correct, and so following standard practice, he employs a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) strategy, in which price forecasts are a recursively revised probability weighted average of the two forecasts. Our main result is to show that asymptotically the weight on the time-varying parameters (TVP) model converges to one, even though the underlying structural parameters are constant. As in Gresham's Law, 'bad models drive out good models'. 2 The intuition for why the TVP model eventually dominates is the following -When the weight on the TVP model is close to one, the world is relatively volatile (due to feedback). This makes the constant parameters model perform relatively poorly, since it is unable to track the feedback-induced time-variation in the data. Of course, the tables are turned when the weight on the TVP model is close to zero. Now the world is relatively tranquil, and the TVP model suffers from additional noise, which puts it at a disadvantage. However, as long as this noise isn't too large, the TVP model can exploit its ability to respond to rare sequences of shocks that generate 'large deviations' in the estimates of the constant parameters model. In a sense, during tranquil times, the TVP model is lying in wait, ready to pounce on large deviation events. These events provide a foothold for the TVP model, which due to feedback, allows it to regain its dominance. It is tempting to speculate whether this sort of self-confirming volatility trap could be one factor in the lingering, long-term effects of rare events like financial crises.
We apply our analysis to a standard linear present value asset pricing model. We show that self-confirming parameter drift can explain observed 'long swings' in asset prices. For reasonable parameter values we find that the unconditional variance of asset prices is nearly double its Rational Expectations value. In a sense, this is not a new result. Many others have found that so-called 'constant gain' (or 'perpetual learning') models are useful for understanding a wide variety of dynamic economic phenomena. 3 However, several nagging questions plague this literature -Why are agents so convinced that parameters are time-varying? In terms of explaining volatility, don't constant gain models "assume the result"? What if agents' beliefs were less dogmatic, and allowed for the possibility that parameters were constant? Our Gresham's Law result answers these questions. It shows that constant gain learning can be a self-confirming equilibrium, even when the underlying environment is stationary.
To prove our Gresham's Law result, we exploit standard time-scale separation methods (Borkar (2008) ). These methods were first applied to the macroeconomic learning literature by Marcet and Sargent (1989) . Time-scale separation methods allow us to effectively 2 Gresham's Law is named for Sir Thomas Gresham, who was a financial adviser to Queen Elizabeth I. He is often credited for noting that 'bad money drives out good money'. Not surprisingly, 'Gresham's Law' is a bit of a misnomer. As DeRoover (1949) documents, it was certainly known before Gresham, with clear descriptions by Copernicus, Oresme, and even Aristophanes. There is also debate about its empirical validity (Rolnick and Weber (1986) ). 3 Examples include: Sargent (1999) , Cho, Williams, and Sargent (2002) , Marcet and Nicolini (2003) , Kasa (2004) , Chakraborty and Evans (2008) , and Benhabib and Dave (2014) .
reduce the dimensionality of our problem. Variables that operate on a relatively slow time-scale can be fixed at their current values, while variables that operate on a relatively fast time-scale can be fixed at the means of their stationary distributions. Our problem features a hierarchy of four time-scales. The data operate on a relatively fast calendar time-scale. Estimates of the TVP model evolve on a slower time-scale, determined by the innovation variance of its parameters. Estimates of the constant parameters model evolve even slower, on a time-scale determined by the inverse of the historical sample size. Finally, the model weight evolves on a variable time scale, but spends most of its time in the neighborhood of either 0 or 1, where it evolves on a time-scale that is even slower than that of the constant parameters model. The fact that the TVP model evolves on a faster time-scale than the constant parameters model is crucial to our Gresham's Law result.
In addition to providing a warning about the potential dangers of model averaging with endogenous data, our paper also provides an example of a new equilibrium concept in learning models. Traditional learning models in macroeconomics typically focus on either representative agent environments, or environments in which agents are assumed to be unaware of the learning efforts of other agents. 4 Here we study an explicitly interactive learning environment, where agents are aware that other agents are learning. Consequently, part of an agent's Perceived Law of Motion (PLM) must include beliefs about how other agents are learning. We follow the traditional learning literature and assume that while these beliefs can be misspecified during the transition, they are statistically confirmed in the limit. Esponda and Pouzo (2015) refer to this as a 'Berk-Nash Equilibrium'. Our paper provides the first fully dynamic example of a Berk-Nash equilibrium. 5 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. We first study learning with only one model, and discuss the sense in which beliefs converge to self-confirming equilibria. We then allow the policymaker to consider both models simultaneously, and examine the implications of Bayesian Model Averaging. Section 3 contains our proof that the weight on the TVP model eventually converges to one. We first study the case where individual forecasters ignore the presence of other forecasters. We then show that under self-confirming beliefs about other forecasters beliefs, the same Gresham's Law result emerges. Section 5 illustrates the results with a variety of simulations. These simulations show that self-confirming parameter drift can generate significant (low frequency) asset price volatility. Sections 6 and 7 discuss the robustness of the results to an alternative interpretation of the model space and an alternative interpretation of model averaging. Instead of a single decision maker who is averaging over two different models, we consider a decentralized situation, in which two different forecasters forward their price forecast to the policy maker, who then forms his own forecast by averaging the two. We show that the main conclusion from the single person model averaging problem is carried over. Section 8 discusses extensions and potential applications, while the Appendix collects proofs of various technical results.
To believe is to see
Our analysis is inspired by the previous work of Evans, Honkapohja, Sargent, and Williams (2013) . They study a standard cobweb model, in which a single agent considers two models, one with constant parameters and one with time-varying parameters. The agent employs BMA when forecasting next period's price. Using simulations, they found that if expectational feedback is sufficiently strong, the weight on the TVP model often converges to one, even though the underlying parameters are constant. They offered some insightful conjectures about why this occurs, but provided no formal analysis. Our paper extends their analysis in a few different directions. First, instead of a cobweb model, where current price depends on previous expectations, we study an asset pricing model, where current price depends on current expectations of future prices. This is arguably a more empirically relevant case in macroeconomics. Second, and more importantly, we apply the tools of large deviations theory to provide a formal convergence analysis of BMA with endogenous data. Third, and perhaps most importantly, we consider an interactive learning environment, in which beliefs about other agents beliefs are explicitly considered. This is aguably more descriptive of the actual forecasting environment confronting macroeconomic policymakers.
2.1. Rational Expectations. Consider the following workhorse asset-pricing model, in which an asset price at time t, p t , is determined according to
where z t denotes observed fundamentals (e.g., dividends), and where α ∈ (0, 1) is a (constant) discount rate, which determines the strength of expectational feedback. Empirically, it is close to one. The t shock is Gaussian white noise. Fundamentals are assumed to evolve according to the AR(1) process
for ρ ∈ (0, 1). The fundamentals shock, z,t , is Gaussian white noise, and is orthogonal to the price shock t . The unique stationary rational expectations equilibrium is
Along the equilibrium path, the dynamics of p t can only be explained by the dynamics of fundamentals, z t . Any excess volatility of p t over the volatility of z t must be soaked-up by the exogenous shock t . It is well known that Rational Expectations versions of this kind of model cannot explain observed asset price volatility (Shiller (1989) ). We explain this volatility by assuming that agents must learn about their environment. Of course, the notion that learning might help to explain asset price volatility is hardly new (see, e.g., Timmermann (1996) for an early and influential example). However, early examples were based on least-squares learning, which exhibited asymptotic convergence to the Rational Expectations Equilibrium. This would be fine if volatility appeared to dissipate over time, but there is no evidence for this. In response, a more recent literature has assumed that agents use so-called constant gain learning, which discounts old data. This keeps learning alive. For example, Benhabib and Dave (2014) show that constant gain learning can generate persistent excess volatility, and can explain why asset prices have fat-tailed distributions even when the distribution of fundamentals is thin-tailed.
Our paper builds on the work of Benhabib and Dave (2014) . The key parameter in their analysis is the update gain. Not only do they assume it is bounded away from zero, but they restrict it to be constant. Following Sargent and Williams (2005) , they note that a constant gain can provide a good approximation to the (steady state) gain of an optimal Kalman filtering algorithm. However, they go on to show that the learning dynamics exhibit recurrent escapes from this steady state. This calls into question whether agents would in fact cling to a constant gain in the presence of such instability. Here we allow the agent to effectively employ a time-varying gain, which is not restricted to be nonzero. We do this by supposing that agents average between a constant gain and a decreasing/least-squares gain. Evolution of the model probability weights delivers a statedependent gain. In some respects, our analysis resembles the gain-switching algorithm of Marcet and Nicolini (2003) . However, they require the agent to commit to one or the other, whereas we permit the agent to be a Bayesian, and average between the two. Despite the fact that our specification of the gain is somewhat different, like Benhabib and Dave (2014) , we rely on the theory of large deviations to provide an analytical characterization of the escape dynamics.
2.2.
Learning with a correct model. Suppose an agent knows the fundamentals process in (2.2), but does not know the structural price equation in (2.1). Instead, the agent postulates the following state-space model for prices
where it is assumed that cov( , v) = 0. Note that the Rational Expectations equilibrium is a special case of this, with
For now, suppose the agent adopts the dogmatic prior that parameters are constant.
M 0 : σ 2 v = 0. Given this belief, he estimates the unknown parameter of his model using the following Kalman filter algorithmβ
where we adopt the common assumption thatβ t is based on time-(t − 1) information, while the time-t forecast of p t+1 , ρβ t z t , can incorporate the latest z t observation. This assumption is made to avoid simultaneity between beliefs and observations. 6 The process, Σ t , represents the agent's evolving estimate of the variance ofβ t .
Notice that given his beliefs that parameters are constant, Σ t converges to zero at rate t −1 . This makes sense. If parameters really are constant, then each new observation contributes less and less relative to the existing stock of knowledge. On the other hand, notice that during the transition, the agent's beliefs are inconsistent with the data. He thinks β is constant, but due to expectational feedback, his own learning causes β to be time-varying. This can be seen by substituting the agent's time-t forecast into the true model in (2.1)
Opinions differ as to whether this inconsistency is important. As long as the T -mapping between beliefs and outcomes has the appropriate stability properties, the agent's incorrect beliefs will eventually be corrected. Learning-induced parameter variation eventually dissipates, and the agent eventually learns the Rational Expectations equilibrium. However, as pointed out by Bray and Savin (1986) , in practice this convergence can be slow, and one might then ask why agents aren't able to detect the parameter variation that their own learning generates. If they do, wouldn't they want to revise their learning algorithm, and if they do, will learning still take place? 7
This debate is largely academic, however, since the more serious problem with this model is that it fails to explain the data. Since learning is transitory, so is any learning induced parameter instability. Although there is some evidence in favor of a 'Great Moderation' in the volatility of macroeconomic aggregates (at least until the recent financial crisis!), there is little or no evidence for such moderation in asset markets. As a result, more recent work assumes agents view parameter instability as a permanent feature of the environment.
2.3.
Learning with a wrong model. Now assume the agent has a different dogmatic prior. Suppose he is now convinced that parameters are time-varying, which can be expressed as the parameter restriction M 1 : σ 2 v > 0. Although this is a 'wrong model' from the perspective of the (unknown) Rational Expectations equilibrium, the more serious specification error here is that the agent does not even entertain the possibility that parameters might be constant. This prevents him from ever learning the Rational Expectations equilibrium (Bullard (1992) ). Still, due to feedback, there is a sense in which his beliefs about parameter instability can be self-confirming, since ongoing belief revisions will produce ongoing parameter instability.
The belief that σ 2 v > 0 produces only a minor change in the Kalman filtering algorithm in (2.5) and (2.6). We just need to replace the Riccati equation in (2.6) with the new Riccati equation (2003) addresses this issue. He pushes the analysis one step back, and shows that if agents start out with a time-varying parameter learning algorithm, but have priors that this variation damps out over time, then agents can still eventually converge to a constant parameter Rational Expectations equilibrium.
The additional σ 2 v term causes Σ t to now converge to a strictly positive limit,Σ > 0. As noted by Benveniste et. al. (1990, pgs. 139-40) , if we assume σ 2 v σ 2 , which we will do in what follows, we can use the approximation σ 2 + Σ t z 2 t ≈ σ 2 in the above formulas (Σ t is small relative to σ 2 and scales inversely with z 2 t ). The Riccati equation in (2.7) then delivers the following approximation for the steady state variance of the state,
denotes the second moment of the fundamentals process. In addition, if we further assume that priors about parameter drift take the particular form, σ 2 v = γ 2 σ 2 M −1 z , then the steady state Kalman filter takes the form of the following (discounted) recursive least-squares algorithm
where priors about parameter instability are now captured by the so-called 'gain' parameter, γ. If the agent thinks parameters are more unstable, he will use a larger gain.
Remember that since the underlying parameters are constant, the agent's model is 'wrong'. Wouldn't a smart agent eventually discover this? 8 On the one hand, this is an easy question to answer. Since his prior dogmatically rules out the 'right' constant parameter model, there is simply no way the agent can ever detect his misspecification, even with an infinite sample. On the other hand, due to the presence of expectational feedback, a more subtle question is whether the agent's beliefs about parameter instability could become 'self-confirming' (Sargent (2008) )? That is, to what extent are the random walk priors in (2.4) consistent with the observed behavior of the parameters in the agent's model? Would an agent have an incentive to revise his prior in light of the data that are themselves (partially) generated by those priors?
It is useful to divide this question into two parts, one related to the innovation variance, σ 2 v , and the other to the random walk nature of the dynamics. As noted above, the innovation variance is captured by the gain parameter. Typically the gain is treated as a free parameter, and is calibrated to match some feature of the data. However, as noted by Sargent (1999, chpt. 6) , in self-referential models the gain should not be treated as a free parameter. It is an equilibrium object. This is because the optimal gain depends on the volatility of the data, but at the same time, the volatility of the data depends on the gain. As in a Rational Expectation Equilbrium, we have a fixed point problem.
In a prescient paper, Evans and Honkapohja (1993) addressed the problem of computing this fixed point. They posed the problem as one of computing a Nash equilibrium. In particular, they ask -Suppose everyone else is using a given gain parameter, so that the data-generating process is consistent with this gain. Would an individual agent have an incentive to switch to a different gain? Under appropriate stability conditions, one can then compute the equilibrium gain by iterating on a best response mapping as usual. Later we exploit this idea to study the stability of our more complex BMA algorithm.
To address the second issue we need to study the dynamics of the agent's parameter estimation algorithm in (2.8). After substituting in the actual price process this can be written asβ
and then define β(τ t ) =β t . We can then form the piecewise-constant continuous-time
Although for a fixed γ (and σ 2 v ) the paths of of β(τ ) are not continuous, they converge to the following continuous limit as σ 2 v → 0 (see Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for a proof) Proposition 2.1. As σ 2 v → 0, β(τ ) converges weakly to the solution of the following diffusion process
This is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, which generates a stationary Gaussian distribution centered on the Rational Expectations equilibrium, β * . Notice that the innovation variance is consistent with the agent's priors, since γ 2 σ 2 M −1 z = σ 2 v . However, notice also that dβ is autocorrelated. That is, β does not follow a random walk. Strictly speaking then, the agent's priors are misspecified. However, remember that traditional definitions of self-confirming equilibria presume agents have access to infinite samples. In practice, agents only have access to finite samples. Given this, we can ask whether the agent could statistically reject his prior. 9 This will be difficult when the drift in (2.10) is small. This is the case when: (1) Estimates are close to the β * , (2) Fundamentals are persistent, so that ρ ≈ 1, and (3) Feedback is strong, so that α ≈ 1.
Model Averaging.
Dogmatic priors (about anything) are rarely a good idea. So now suppose agents hedge their bets by entertaining the possibility that parameters are constant. Forecasts are then constructed using a traditional Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) strategy. This strategy effectively 'convexifies' the model space.
There are two ways to think about model averaging. One is to assume the competing models are in the mind of a single agent. This is the interpretation in Evans, Honkapohja, Sargent, and Williams (2013) . However, if this is the case, it is hard to understand why the agent does not just expand the model space to include a model which nests both. In the above setting, this would mean estimating a single model where σ 2 v is viewed as a parameter to be estimated. The second way to think about model averaging is from a more decentralized perspective, where multiple agents construct and revise models, which are then 'marketed' to a single decisionmaker, who does not himself construct models. This is arguably more descriptive of actual macroeconomic forecasting, and model averaging emerges quite naturally in this case. 10 We are going to consider both possibilities, mainly for pedagogical reasons. This is because the first approach is easier to formalize, since it just involves specifying the beliefs of a single agent. In contrast, with multiple agents and multiple models, one must specify how agents perceive the forecasting efforts of other agents. If agents are aware that forecasts are being used by a policymaker, whose actions potentially influence the data-generating process, they must then form beliefs over other forecasters' beliefs. For example, even if you are convinced the underlying environment is stationary, if you know a policymaker is putting some weight on a TVP model, then your own model must allow for the induced nonstationarity. Of course, specifying beliefs about others' beliefs is fraught with difficulties. In Bayesian settings it quickly produces an infinite regress, which can only be tamed by introducing strong coordination assumptions, like common priors. Rather than pursue this route, we introduce an element of bounded rationality, by allowing agents' beliefs about other agents' beliefs to be misspecified. However, as in Esponda and Pouzo (2015) , we impose discipline by requiring beliefs to be statistically confirmed in the limit. As it turns out, the asymptotic properties of the model averaging dynamics are the same for both the single agent and multiple agent environments. We start with the former, as it is easier. Once the argument is clear for this case, the more complex interactive learning environment will be easier to understand.
Let π t denote the current probability assigned by the policymaker to M 1 , the TVP model, and let β t (i) denote the current parameter estimate for M i . The policymaker's time-t forecast becomes 11
Substituting this into the actual law of motion for prices implies that parameter estimates evolve according to
As usual, we suppose the policymaker neglects the feedback from his forecast to the actual price process. Note that the only difference between the two parameter update equations arises from their gain sequences, Σ t (i). With a single forecaster who neglects feedback, these two gain sequences are independent of model averaging. Still, it appears things have become vastly more complicated. Not only are the β t (i)'s coupled, but they appear to depend on the evolution of the model weights, π t . Fortunately, things are not as bad as they look, thanks to a time-scale separation, and the following global asymptotic stability result, which shows that the β t (i)'s converge to the same, unique, self-confirming equilibrium values for any fixed value of π t :
This result is not too surprising, since both models are forecasting the same thing using the same variable. However, it is quite useful, since it implies that all the action in the dynamics lies in the evolution of the model weight, π t .
Model Averaging Dynamics
This section proves our Gresham's Law result. As noted earlier, we proceed in two steps. We first prove the result for the case of single-agent model averaging. In Section 7, we argue that the result extends to the case of multiple-agent model averaging. Since our analysis relies heavily on time-scale separation methods, we begin with a brief discussion of time scales.
3.1. Time scales. Since each component of (β t (1), β t (0), π t ) evolves at a different "speed," it is important to define clearly a notion of speed in terms of a benchmark time scale. We use the sample average time scale, t −1 , as the benchmark. This is the time-scale at which β t (0) evolves. More precisely, ∀τ > 0, we can find the unique integer satisfying
Let m(τ ) = K and define
We are interested in sample paths over the tail interval [t K , t K + τ ). Hence, we are interested in the speed of evolution in the right hand tail of a stochastic process.
It is important to recall that the function m which maps "fictitious time" to a number of periods is defined for the sample average time scale, and that we are interested in the right tail of the sequence.
Definition 3.1. Let ϕ t be a stochastic process. We say that ϕ t evolves on a faster time
with a positive probability, and evolves on a slower time scale than
with probability 1. We say that ϕ t evolves on the same time scale as β t (0) if ϕ t does not evolve at a faster or slower time scale.
If a stochastic process ϕ t has a recursive representation
where X t is the state variable, Y t is a uniformly bounded function, and ε t > 0 is the gain function, we can compare time scales by comparing gain functions. Consider another recursive formulaφ with uniformly boundedỸ t and gain functionε t > 0. One can show that ϕ t evolves on a faster time scale thanφ t if lim t→∞ε t ε t = 0.
Hence, if a stochastic process can be represented recursively, it makes sense to represent its time scale or speed of evolution in terms of its gain sequence.
3.2. Odds ratio. Proposition 2.2 implies that the dynamics are driven by the dynamics of the model weight, π t . The policymaker updates his beliefs about models using Bayes Rule. After a long tedious calculation, the Bayesian updating scheme for π t can be written as (see Evans, Honkapohja, Sargent, and Williams (2013) for a partial derivation)
is the time-t predictive likelihood function for model M i , and
is the mean-squared forecast error of M i . Remember thatp t (i) depends on assumptions about the nature of model averaging. In the single-agent case, the multiple models are in the mind of the policymaker, andp t (i) = ρβ t (i)z t . In the multiple-agent case, the policymaker uses the forecasts provided by other agents, and thep t (i) are given by the more complicated expressions in equations (7.27).
To study the dynamics of π t it is useful to rewrite eq. (3.13) as follows
which has the familiar form of a discrete-time replicator equation, with a stochastic, statedependent, fitness function determined by the likelihood ratio. Equation (3.14) reveals a lot about the model averaging dynamics. First, it is clear that the boundary points π = {0, 1} are trivially stable fixed points, since they are absorbing. Second, we can also see that there could be an interior fixed point, where E(A t+1 (1)/A t+1 (0)) = 1. Later we shall see that this occurs when π = 1 2ρα , which is interior if feedback is strong enough (i.e., if α > 1 2ρ ). However, we shall also see there that this fixed point is unstable. So we know already that π t will spend most of its time near the boundary points. This will become apparent when we turn to the simulations in Section 4. One remaining issue is whether π t could ever become absorbed at one of the boundary points. Since the distributions here are assumed to be Gaussian, they obviously have full support, so Proposition 3.2 applies. Although the boundary points are unattainable in finite time, the replicator equation for π t in eq. (3.14) makes it clear that π t will spend most of its time near these boundary points, since the relationship between π t and π t+1 has the familiar logit function shape, which flattens out near the boundaries. As a result, π t evolves very slowly near the boundary points. In fact, we shall now show that it evolves even more slowly than the t −1 time-scale of β t (0). This means that when studying the dynamics of the coefficient estimates near the boundaries, we can treat π t as fixed.
3.3. Log Odds Ratio. As usual, it is more convenient to consider the log odds ratio. Let us initialize the likelihood ratio at the prior odds ratio:
By iteration we get
Taking logs and dividing by (t + 1),
Now define the average log odds ratio, φ t , as follows
which can be written recursively as the following stochastic approximation algorithm
Invoking well knowing results from stochastic approximation, we know that the asymptotic properties of φ t are determined by the stability properties of the following ODĖ
which has a unique stable point
The focus of the ensuing analysis is to identify the conditions under which π t converges to 1, or 0. Thus, the sign of φ * , rather than its value, is an important object of investigation. We show that π t evolves even more slowly than the t −1 time-scale of β t (0) and φ t . This means that when studying the dynamics of the coefficient estimates near the boundaries, we can treat π t as fixed, as we did in Proposition 2.2. In order to make the notion of "more slowly" precise, we need to define precisely the time scale.
Note that the notion of time scale is a property of a stochastic process in the right tail. That is, the time-scale measures the speed of evolution of the sample paths for large t. Although π t can evolve faster than β t (1) for small t, as t → ∞, we show that π t must stay in a small neighborhood of 1 or 0, slowly converging to the limit. P ∃{π t k } k , and ∃π * ∈ (0, 1), lim k→∞ π t k = π * = 0 and π t evolves at a slower time scale than 1/t.
Therefore, without loss of generality, we can assume that π = {0, 1} are the only limit points of {π t }. After renumbering a convergent subsequence, suppose π t → 1. Following the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 3.3, we can prove that
If αρ > 1/2, and π t close to 1, then a simple calculation shows that
with probability 1. Given β t (0) = β t (1) = δ/(1 − αρ), π t → 1 with probability 1, proving that π t = 1 is locally attracting. Similarly, we can show that if π t is close to 0, then
Following the same argument, we prove that π t = 0 is locally attracting. In general, the speed of evolution of π t compared to β t (i) (i = 1, 2) is difficult to compute. But, in the neighborhood of the boundaries, we can show that π t evolves on an even slower time scale than β t (0). Lemma 3.4. Suppose that φ * = 0. Then, π t evolves at a slower time scale than 1/t (or β t (0)).
Proof. See Appendix D
Lemma 3.4 asserts that in the neighborhood of the boundaries, the hierarchy of time scales is such that β t (1) evolves at a faster time scale than β t (0), while β t (0), which evolves on the same time scale as φ t , evolves at a faster time scale than π t . This time scale hierarchy greatly facilitates the analysis of escape dynamics.
Convergence.
Exploiting the time-scale hierarchy, we can first characterize the asymptotic properties of β t (1), for fixed values of (β t (0), π t ). After calculating the invariant distribution of β t (1), we then investigate the asymptotic properties of β t (0), and then finally those of π t . Since the proof is very much in line with the second part of the proof of Lemma 3.3, we just state the result without proof.
Proposition 3.5. lim t→∞ β t (1) = δ 1−αρ weakly, while lim t→∞ β t (0) = δ 1−αρ with probability 1. π t → {0, 1} with probability 1, as t → ∞.
It is helpful to calculate the domain of attraction of each locally stable point. Comparing the likelihoods, we can compute the domain of attraction for (π, β(0), β(1)) = (0, δ 1−ρα , δ 1−ρα ) is the interior of
where the mean-squared forecast error of M 0 is smaller than that of M 1 . The difference arises from the fact that the expected likelihood ratio differs from the ratio of expected mean-squared forecast errors.
The interior of the complement of D 0 is the domain of attraction for (π, β(0), β(1)) = (1, δ 1−ρα , δ 1−ρα ) For small σ v > 0, one can imagine D 0 as a narrow "cone" in the space of (β(0), π), with its apex at (β(0), π) = δ 1−αρ , 1 2αρ and its base along the line π = 0, where β(0) is in Figure 1 plots D 0 for the baseline parameter values used in the following simulations. The formal analysis will make the notion of being "narrow" precise.
Escape Probabilities
We have three endogenous variables (π t , β t (0), β 1 (1)), which converge to one of the two locally stable points: (0, δ/(1 − αρ), δ/(1 − αρ)) or (1, δ/(1 − αρ), δ/ (1 − αρ) ). Let us identify a specific stable point by the value of π t at the stable point. Similarly, let D 0 be the domain of attraction to π t = 0, and D 1 be the domain of attraction to π t = 1.
For fixed σ 2 v > 0, the distribution of (π t , β t (0), β 1 (1)) assigns a large weight to either of the two locally stable points as t → ∞. Our main interest is the limit of this probability distribution as σ 2 v → 0. To calculate the limit probability distribution, we need to calculate the probabilities that (π t , β t (0), β 1 (1)) escape from each domain of attraction. Standard results from large deviation theory imply that the escape probabilities can be parameterized by their large deviation rate functions. 
The large deviation parameter r i (i = 1, 2) quantifies how difficult it is to escape from D i , with r i = ∞ meaning that the escape never occurs, and r i = 0 meaning that the escape occurs immediately with probability 1 (on a logarithmic time-scale).
To calculate the relative duration times of (π t , β t (0), β t (1)) around each locally attractive boundary point, we need to compute the following ratio
Note that (π t , β t (0), β t (1)) stays in the neighborhood of 1, δ 1−αρ , δ 1−αρ almost always in the limit, if r 0 < r 1 , and vice versa.
Proposition 4.2.
r 1 > r 0 .
In the limit, the TVP model prevails, driving out the constant parameter model.
Proof. See Appendix E.
If σ 2 v > 0 is small, it is extremely difficult to detect whether M 1 is misspecified in the sense that the forecaster includes a variable v,t which does not exist in the rational expectations equilibrium. For fixed σ 2 v > 0, the asymptotic distribution of π t assigns a large weight to 1 and 0, since 1 and 0 are locally stable points. Between the two locally stable points, we are interested in which locally stable point is more salient than the other. One way to determine which equilibrium is more salient than the other would be to compare the amount of time when π t stays in a small neighborhood of each locally stable point. For fixed T , σ 2 v and ε > 0, define
as the number of calendar time periods during which π t is within a small neighborhood of 1. Since 0 and 1 are the only two locally stable points, π t stays in the neighborhood of 0 for most of the remaining T − T 1 periods. As a corollary of Proposition 4.2, we can show that for a small σ 2 v > 0, π t stays in the neighborhood of 1 almost always.
with probability 1.
The TVP model asymptotically dominates because it is better able to react to the volatility that it itself creates. Although M 1 is misspecified, this equilibrium must be learned via some adaptive process. What our result shows is that this learning process can be subverted by the mere presence of misspecified alternatives, even when the correctly specified model would converge if considered in isolation. This result therefore echoes the conclusions of Sargent (1993) , who notes that adaptive learning models often need a lot of 'prompting' before they converge. Elimination of misspecified alternatives can be interpreted as a form of prompting.
Simulations
As noted in Section 2, the present-value asset pricing model in eqs. (2.1)-(2.2) has been subjected to a lot of previous empirical work, mostly with negative results. Perhaps its biggest problem is its failure to generate sufficient volatility (Shiller (1989) ). Our results suggest that this negative assessment could be premature. To examine this possibility, we calibrate the model using parameter values that have been used in the past, and see whether this can generate the sort of self-confirming volatility that our analysis suggests is possible.
Most of the parameters are easy to calibrate. We know observed fundamentals are persistent, so we set ρ = .99. Remember, the agent is assumed to know this. Similarly, we know discount factors are close to 1, so we set the feedback parameter to α = .96. Since δ depends on units, we just normalize it by setting δ = (1 − αρ) . This implies the selfconfirming equilibrium value, β = 1.0. In principle, the innovations variances, (σ 2 , σ 2 z ), could be calibrated to match those of observed assets prices and fundamentals. However, since what really matters is the comparison between actual and predicted volatility, we follow Evans, Honkapohja, Sargent, and Williams (2013) and just normalize them to unity (σ 2 = σ 2 z = 1). That leaves one remaining free parameter, σ 2 v . Of course, this is a crucial parameter, since it determines the agent's prior beliefs about parameter instability. If it's too big, then the TVP model will be at a big disadvantage during tranquil times, and will therefore have a difficult time displacing the constant parameter model. On the other hand, if it's too small, self-confirming volatility will be empirically irrelevant.
Figures 2-5 report typical simulations for three alternative values, σ 2 v = (.0005, , .0001, .00001) . 0005. When this is the case, steady-state price volatility is 93.3% higher when π = 1 than when π = 0, which is quite significant, although less than the excess volatility detected by Shiller (1989) . The higher price volatility when π = 1 is apparent. The implied steady-state gain associated with this value of σ 2 v is γ = .07, which is quite typical of values used in prior empirical work. These figures also illustrate a typical feature of the sample paths when σ 2 v is relatively high, i.e., convergence to one or the other boundaries occurs relatively quickly, usually by around T = 500. Figure 4 , where σ 2 v = .0001, convergence to π = 1 once again takes place, but now its price volatility implications are not quite so dramatic. Volatility is only 41.7% higher when π = 1. Once again, the implied steady-state gain (γ = .03) is typical of values used in empirical work. Figure 5 uses a still smaller prior variance, σ 2 v = .00001. Now the two models do not differ by much. Steady-state price volatility is only 13% higher when π = 1. Notice that because the two models are so similar, it becomes easier to escape the π = 1 equilibrium. Since the TVP world is not that volatile, a constant parameter model does not do that badly. 12 The one feature that is perhaps not accurately portrayed by these figures is the fact that on empirically relevant time-scales convergence to either boundary can occur. This fact was emphasized by Evans, Honkapohja, Sargent, and Williams (2013) . Although our previous results imply that eventually the π = 1 equilibrium will dominate, our simulations indicate that the π = 0 equilibrium can persist for a long time. For example, we conducted 10,000 simulations, each of length T = 2000, and counted the proportion of times convergence to π = 1 occurred for various values of σ 2 v . As above, the simulations were initialized at π = 0.5, with small random perturbations of the coefficients around their self-confirming equilibrium values. Figure 6 displays the results, Not surprisingly, the probability of convergence to π = 1 declines with σ 2 v . For σ 2 v = .1 × 10 −4 , convergence occurs more than 80% of the time, whereas for the benchmark value used above, σ 2 v = 5 × 10 −4 , convergence to π = 1 occurs only about 60% of the time. 13 As our above analysis makes clear, however, one must exercise some caution when interpreting results like these. In Figure 6 , 'convergence' was simply defined as the value of π at the end of each simulation run (i.e., at T = 2000). According to our large deviations results, however, eventually π will escape from 1. What our theory actually predicts is that as the sample length becomes infinitely long, the proportion of time spent near π = 1 goes to unity. It doesn't imply that π never returns to 0. Although escapes from π = 1 are more likely to occur relatively early in the game, before β t (0) has settled down, as σ 2 v decreases, escapes can occur relatively late as well. Figure 5 nicely illustrates this possibility. Hence, the results in Figure 6 are merely meant to convey the possibility that on realistic time-scales, 'convergence' to either π = 1 or to π = 0 can occur.
The fact that convergence to either π = 0 or π = 1 can occur on relevant time-scales is interesting, since it suggests that whether we live in a tranquil or volatile economy is somewhat random and history-dependent. It also highlights a potentially adverse longterm effect of 'large deviation' events, like financial crises. Although being alert to the possibility of financial crises is probably a good thing on net, if it makes individuals living in a less than fully understood self-referential environment more reactive, it could create its own problems.
Stability
Our Gresham's Law result casts doubt on the ability of agents to adaptively learn a contant parameters Rational Expectations equilibrium, unless they dogmatically believe that this is the only possible equilibrium. Here we investigate the robustness of this result to an alternative specification of the model space.
Normally, with exogenous data, it would make no difference whether a parameter known to lie in some interval is estimated by mixing between the two extremes, or by estimating it directly. With endogenous data, however, this could make a difference. What if the agent convexified the model space by estimating σ 2 v directly, via some sort of nonlinear adaptive filtering algorithm (e.g., Mehra (1972) ), or perhaps by estimating a time-varying gain instead, via an adaptive step-size algorithm (Kushner and Yang (1995) )? Although π = 1 is locally stable against nonlocal alternative models, would it also be stable against local alternatives?
In this case, there is no model averaging. There is just one model, with σ 2 v viewed as an unknown parameter to be estimated. To address the stability question we exploit the connection discussed in section 2.3 between σ 2 v and the steady-state gain, γ. Because the data are endogenous, we must employ the macroeconomist's 'big K, little k' trick, which in our case we refer to as 'big Γ, little γ'. That is, our stability question can be posed as follows: Given that data are generated according to the aggregate gain parameter Γ, would an individual agent have an incentive to use a different gain, γ? If not, then γ = Γ is a Nash equilibrium gain, and the associated σ 2 v > 0 represents self-confirming parameter instability. The stability question can then be addressed by checking the (local) stability of the best response map, γ = B(Γ), at the self-confirming equilibrium.
To simplify the analysis, we consider a special case, where z t = 1 (i.e., ρ = 1 and σ z = 0). The true model becomes 6.15) and the agent's perceived model becomes
where σ v is now considered to be an unknown parameter. Note that if σ 2 v > 0, the agent's model is misspecified. As in Sargent (1999) , the agent uses a random walk to approximate a constant mean. Equations (5.18)-(5.19) represent an example of Muth's (1960) 'random walk plus noise' model, in which constant gain updating is optimal. To see this, write p t as the following ARMA(1,1) process
where s = σ 2 v /σ 2 is the signal-to-noise ratio. Muth (1960) showed that optimal price forecasts, E t p t+1 ≡p t+1 , evolve according to the constant gain algorithm
This implies that the optimal forecast of next period's price is just a geometrically distributed average of current and past prices,
Substituting this into the true model in eq. (6.15) yields the actual price process as a function of aggregate beliefs
Now for the 'big Γ, little γ' trick. Suppose prices evolve according eq. (6.21), and that an individual agent has the perceived model
What would be the agent's optimal gain? The solution of this problem defines a best response map, γ = B(Γ), and a fixed point of this mapping, γ = B(γ), defines a Nash equilibrium gain. Note that the agent's model is misspecified, since it omits the constant that appears in the actual prices process in eq. (6.21). The agent needs to use γ to compromise between tracking the dynamics generated by Γ > 0, and fitting the omitted constant,p. This compromise is optimally resolved by minimizing the Kullback-Leibler (KLIC) distance between equations (6.21) and (6.22) 14
where F (ω) = f (e −iω )f (e iω ) and H(ω) = h(e −iω )h(e iω ) are the spectral densities of f (L) in eq. (6.21) and h(L) in eq. (6.22). Although this problem cannot be solved with pencil and paper, it is easily solved numerically. Figure 8 plots the best response map using the same benchmark parameter values as before (except, of course, ρ = 1 now) 15 Not surprisingly, the agent's optimal gain increases when the external environment becomes more volatile, i.e., as Γ increases. What is more interesting is that the slope of the best response mapping is less than one. This means the equilibrium gain is stable. If agents believe that parameters are unstable, no single agent can do better by thinking they are less unstable. Figure 8 suggests that the best response map intersects the 45 degree line somewhere in the interval (.10, .15 ). This suggests that the value of σ 2 v used for the benchmark TVP model in section 4 was a little too small, since it implied a steady-state gain of .072.
Multiple Agent Model Averaging
Now consider a decentralized setting with three interacting (types of) agents: Two masses of competing, infinitesimal forecasters (M 0 and M 1 ), and a policymaker who combines forecasts. The policymaker is the only agent engaged in model averaging. Individual forecasters recursively update a single model. However, forecasters know their forecasts are being averaged by the policymaker, and unlike the policymaker, they are aware of the potential feedback from forecasts to prices. As a result, their model specifications must include beliefs about how other forecasters are forecasting. These beliefs take the form of conjectures about other forecasters' beliefs about stationarity. M 1 thinks M 0 uses a constant parameter model, while M 0 thinks M 1 uses a random coefficients model with i.i.d. fluctuations around a constant mean. Both beliefs are misspecified, since they neglect the other agent's learning dynamics. However, as in traditional (representative agent) learning models, these misspecifications disappear asymptotically.
where η = .995. This means that our frequency domain objective is ill-equipped to find the degenerate fixed point where γ = Γ = 0. When this is the case, the true model exhibits i.i.d fluctuations around a mean of δ/ (1 − α) , while the agent's perceived model exhibits i.i.d fluctuations around a mean of zero. The only difference between these two processes occurs at frequency zero, which is only being approximated here.
To be more specific, we can summarize the beliefs of M 0 and M 1 as a pair of perceived state space models. The perceived observation equation for M 0 is
Although forecasters are assumed to know the policymaker's current model weight, π t , the coefficients on z t are assumed to be hidden states. An overbar is used to represent an agent's belief about the other agent's model. M 0 has the following perceived state transition equation
where v,t is i.i.d Gaussian white noise. That is, M 0 thinks the coefficient on z t 'should be' constant, but at the same time recognizes the influence of a competing forecast based on alternative assumptions. Both equations are misspecified, since they both neglect the presence of learning dynamics. Misspecification about β t (0) will disappear at the usual t −1 rate. Misspecification about β t (1) will persist, since in fact M 1 's parameter estimate is governed by the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process described in Proposition 2.1. However, viewed on the appropriate time-scale, this misspecification will also disappear. From the viewpoint of M 0 , β t (0) appears to be drawn from the stationary distribution which is a solution of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, centered at a constant. M 1 has the following perceived state transition equation
That is, M 1 thinks the coefficient on z t 'should be' drifting, but at the same time thinks rival forecasters are using a constant parameter model. Once again, these equations are misspecified during the transition, but will be confirmed in the limit. Both forecasters estimate their perceived state space models using the Kalman filter. This generates a sequence of hidden state estimates which can then be substituted into the perceived observation equations to generate sequences of price forecasts.
The policymaker takes these two forecasts and averages them using the known weight,
The actual time-t price is then determined by the (unknown) structural model in eq. (2.1),
Notice that if equations (7.27) are substituted into (7.28), which is then substituted into the actual price equation (7.29), we observe that the agents' models in (7.23) and (7.24) suffer from an additional form of misspecification, since each forecaster fails to recognize that their own forecast embodies a form of model averaging in its response to the other forecasters' forecasts. However, like the neglected learning dynamics, this misspecification will disappear in the limit. We can invoke virtually identical analysis as in Sections 3 and 4. We state the main result without proof.
Proposition 7.1. In the decentralized equilibrium featuring three players, we again have lim t→∞ β t (1) = δ 1−αρ weakly, while lim t→∞ β t (0) = δ 1−αρ with probability 1. π t → {0, 1} with probability 1, as t → ∞. ∀ε > 0,
where T 1 is the number of periods π t is within ε > 0 neighborhood of 1.
It must be emphasized that the two forecasters have different views about the stationarity of the economy, even in the long run. Since M 1 believes that β t (1) evolves according to a random walk, he expects to see the coefficient drift. If feedback is strong and fundamentals are persistent, this belief can persist for a very long time, as noted in the discussion following Proposition 2.1. Interestingly, given knowledge of the policymaker's model averaging strategy, the persistence of his misspecification is independent of π t . If π t is close to 1, his belief will be confirmed for as long as it takes to reject a near random walk. On the other hand, if π t is close to 0, the conditional variance of prices is close to σ 2 . But, this small variation of the price does not contradict his belief that β t (1) evolves according to a random walk, because M 1 realizes that the actual price is partly determined by π t , which is selected by the policymaker. Hence, he can rationalize the small gap between the actual variance of price and σ 2 coherently, as a consequence of π t being close to 0, rather than as invalidating his belief that the coefficient would drift if his model were given more weight.
The fact that M 1 maintains his belief even in the neighborhood of π t = 0 is crucial for the escape dynamics of π t from the neighborhood of 0. When the M 0 forecast fares badly due to a sequence of unusual events, the M 1 forecast can quickly adjust to the event, which triggers a self-reinforcing escape of π t away from 0 to 1.
At the same time, M 0 maintains his belief that the economy is stationary. If π t is close to 0, his belief is confirmed by the data, since the data is generated by what M 0 forecasts. If π t is close to 1, the data is mostly generated by what M 1 forecasts. However, M 0 infers that β t (1) is moving around δ/ (1 − αρ) , and can rationalize the gap between observed price variation and σ 2 in terms of the noise v,t introduced by M 1 forecaster. Hence, the data are also consistent with what M 0 believes. This feature of persistently misspecified beliefs is reminiscent of the Berk-Nash equilibrium of Esponda and Pouzo (2015) , who distinguish between Nash and self-confirming equilibria. In a Nash equilibrium, each player's belief must be correctly specified, and their strategies must be econometrically identified. If we relax the requirement that equilibrium strategies be identified, we have a self-confirming equilibrium. If we also relax the requirement of correctly specified models, we then have the Berk-Nash equilibrium of Esponda and Pouzo (2015) . Our model is not game theoretic, but nonetheless captures key features of a Berk-Nash equilibrium. We formulate the beliefs of each player in terms of a perceived law of motion. Since the perceived law of motion of M 0 about β t (1) is not equal to the actual law of motion of β t (1), the belief of M 0 is misspecified. In the long run, M 0 cannot identify whether β t (1) is evolving according to a random walk, or whether it is drawn from a stationary distribution. As a result, M 0 maintains a misspecified belief even in the long run, different from what M 1 perceives about the economy.
Conclusion
Parameter instability is a fact of life for applied econometricians. This paper has proposed one explanation for why this might be. We show that if econometric models are used in a less than fully understood self-referential environment, parameter instability can become a self-confirming equilibrium. Parameter estimates are unstable simply because model-builders think they might be unstable.
Clearly, this sort of volatility trap is an undesirable state of affairs, which raises questions about how it could be avoided. There are two main possibilities. First, not surprisingly, better theory would produce better outcomes. The agents here suffer bad outcomes because they do not fully understand their environment. If they knew the true model in eq. (2.1), they would know that data are endogenous, and would avoid reacting to their own shadows. They would simply estimate a constant parameters reduced form model. A second, and arguably more realistic possibility, is to devise econometric procedures that are more robust to misspecified endogeneity. In Cho and Kasa (2015) , we argue that in this sort of environment, model selection might actually be preferable to model averaging. If agents selected either a constant or TVP model based on sequential application of a specification or hypothesis test, the constant parameter model would prevail, as it would no longer have to compete with the TVP model. Hence, if (C.35) holds for some t ≥ 1, then it holds again for t + 1, and vice versa. Thus, πt continues to increase or decrease, if the inequality holds in either direction. Recall that π * = limt→∞ πt. Convergence to π * can occur only if (C.35) holds with equality for all t ≥ 1, which is a zero probability event. We conclude that π * ∈ (0, 1) occurs with probability 0.
Appendix D. Proof of Lemma 3.4
Given any α ≥ 1, a simple calculation shows
.
As t → ∞, we know φt → φ * with probability 1. Hence, we have lim t→∞ t α (πt − πt−1) = lim t→∞ t α e −φ * − 1 e tφ *
(1 + e tφ * )(1 + e (t−1)φ * ) = (e −φ * − 1) lim t→∞ t α (1 + e −tφ * )(1 + e tφ * e −φ * ) Finally, notice that for both φ * > 0 and φ * < 0 the denominator converges to ∞ faster than the numerator for any α ≥ 1. The main conclusion follows from the observation that πt ∝ 1 t if and only if 0 < lim inf t→∞ |t 2 (πt − πt−1)| ≤ lim sup t→∞ |t 2 (πt − πt−1)| < ∞.
In our case, the left inequality is violated, which implies that πt evolves at a rate slower than 1/t. Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 4.2 E.1. Preliminaries. Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4 shows that βt(1) moves at the fastest time scale, followed by βt(0) and then πt. The same reasoning also shows the domain of attraction for π = 0 is D0 = (π, β(0), β(1)) | E log At(0) At(1) > 0 and the domain of attraction for π = 1 is D1 = (π, β(0), β(1)) | E log At(0) At(1) < 0 .
Since βt(1) does not trigger the escape from one domain of attraction to another, let us focus on (π, β(0), assuming that we are moving according to the time scale of βt(0). A simple calculation shows that D0 has a narrow symmetric shape of (π, β(0)), centered around (0) is defined for βt(0) = βt(1) = δ 1−αρ , and π = 1 or 0. We know that π = 1 and π = 0 are only limit points of {πt}. Define φ * − as φ * evaluated at (β(1), β(0), π) = ( δ 1−αρ , δ 1−αρ , 1) and similarly, φ * + as φ * evaluated at (β(1), β(0), π) = ( δ 1−αρ , δ 1−αρ , 0). A straightforward calculation shows {(β(1), β(0) , π) | π >π}.
For fixed σv > 0, define r * 1 (σv) = − lim t→∞ 1 t log P ∃t, (βt(1), βt(0), πt) ∈ D 1 | (β1(1), β1(0 We know lim t→∞ log P (∃t, φt > 0 | φ1 = φ * − ) = r * 1 (σv). We claim that r * 1 > 0.
(E.37)
The substance of this claim is that r * 1 cannot be equal to 0. This statement would have been trivial, if φ * − is uniformly bounded away from 0. In our case, however, It is tempting to conclude that we can invoke the law of large numbers to conclude that the sample average has a finite but strictly positive rate function. However, log At(0) At(1) − E log At (0) At (1) Σ is not a martingale difference. Although its mean converges to 0, we cannot invoke Cramér's theorem to show the existence of a positive rate function. Instead, we shall invoke Gärtner Ellis theorem (Dembo and Zeitouni (1998) ).
We can write 1 t Et log At(0) At(1) − E log At (0) At (1) Σ .
We claim that ∀λ ∈ R, (0) At (1) ≤ .
Thus, as t → ∞,
Since > 0 is arbitrary, we have the desired conclusion. We conclude that the H functional (a.k.a., the logarithmic moment generating function) of That means, the large deviation properties of the left hand side of (E.38) is the same as the large deviation properties of Zt. Since Zt is the sample average of a martingale difference, a standard argument from large deviation theory implies that its rate function is strictly positive for given σv > 0. We normalized the martingale difference by dividing each term by Σ so that the second moment of log At(0) At(1) − Et log At (0) At (1) Σ is uniformly bounded away from 0, even in the limit as σv → 0. Hence, lim σv →0
H(λ)
does not vanish to 0, which could have happened if the second moment of the marginal difference converges to 0. By applying Gärtner Ellis Theorem, we conclude that ∃r * 1 (σv) > 0 such that 
